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BEYOND AND BELOW THE NEW 
URBANISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND 
RESPONSIVE SPATIAL RECONSTRUCTION 
ARCHON FUNG * 
Abstract: This article examines a strategy called responsive 
participatory redesign (RPR): in it, ordinary citizens attempt to pro-
actively correct defects in existing spatial arrangements that contribute 
to problems such as neighborhood crime. This approach offers 
important advantages over more top-down strategies of community-
friendly design such as those of the "New Urbanism" such as its capacity 
to manage unintended consequences, draw direct citizen engagement, 
and economize on the resources available for public problem solving. 
Recent developments under the rubric of Chicago's Alternative Policing 
Strategy (CAPS) have unintentionally created some of the building 
blocks of RPR, and several early experiences illustrate the modest 
contributions to the quality of neighborhood life that this public policy 
approach can yield. 
To solve problems, instead of evading them, takes creativity and the solu-
tions are not necessarily obvious until after the fact. To keep a society's older 
work from deteriorating also requires constant creativity. Older ways of Or-
ganizing the work and carrying it on don't serve any longer when the scale 
of the work expands or becomes more complex. l 
I. PARTICIPATION AND URBAN RECONFIGURATION 
Old and new traditions in planning and urban design recognize 
the critical effect of spatial contours upon the vitality of local com-
munities. Quite unintentionally, recent developments in the city of 
Chicago have created institutional feedback loops in which residents 
can respond to neighborhood problems by reconstructing local geog-
raphies in ways that mitigate harms and enhance the possibilities for 
rich social life. These policies, intended in the first instance to en-
* Ass't Prof. Public Policy,John F. Kennedy School of Gov't, Harvard u.; Ph.D., 1999, 
Mass. Inst. Tech.; B.S. Physics, 1990, Mass. Inst. Tech.; B.S. Philosophy, 1990, Mass. Inst. 
Tech. 
1 Leticia Kent, Jane Jacobs: Against Urban Renewa~ for Urban Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
1969 (Magazine), at 35 (quotingJaneJacobs). 
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hance public safety through community policing, have created a 
structure for hundreds of simultaneous efforts in neighborhood-level 
participatory planning. If it were self-conscious, this strategy might be 
called responsive participatory redesign (RPR): in it, ordinary citizens 
attempt to pro-actively correct defects in existing spatial arrange-
ments. This Article examines the building blocks of RPR as found in 
Chicago and argues that this approach offers important advantages 
over top-down strategies of community-friendly designs such as the 
New Urbanism.2 
Four important organizing principles emerge from considering 
developments at the intersection of community policing and spatial 
reconfiguration: (1) citizen participation; (2) critical feedback loops 
connecting the quality of community action and the conduciveness of 
physical space; (3) retrospective and incremental strategies of spatial 
improvement; and (4) the construction of enabling participatory po-
litical and administrative institutions. 
In RPR, the principle of participation means that citizens ought 
to have a voice in shaping the public spaces that they use. In Chicago, 
residents have played crucial roles (sometimes with planners and 
other officials or professionals, sometimes without them) in recogniz-
ing problematic space, developing solutions, and eventually imple-
menting reconfigurations. This bottom-up dynamic brings the local 
knowledge, ingenuity, and legitimacy of citizen-activists to bear on the 
problem of urban design. By contrast, New Urbanists often privilege 
the knowledge and capacity of planners and architects to design 
spaces that serve the best interests of citizens and thereby advance 
community formation. In doing so, New Urbanists inject the goal of 
establishing vibrant community into professional priorities, but forego 
potential contributions from the beneficiaries of these designs. 
A second organizing principle of RPR identifies a constructive 
feedback loop connecting the quality of community action with the 
physical context that structures the community. When citizens organ-
ize to alter their common spatial circumstances, they can construct 
environments that are in turn more conducive to community building 
and social organizing. Prescriptively, this observation suggests that a 
feedback loop might be self-consciously intensified through public 
policies and institutional arrangements that, for example, encourage 
citizens to consider the consequences of the public spaces they in-
2 See generally PETER KATZ, THE NEW URBANISM: TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF COM-
MUNITY (1994). 
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habit, and empower them to positively transform those spaces. Con-
ceptually, this descriptive and normative principle reverses the causal 
emphasis of New Urbanist perspectives. There, the chain of cause and 
effect runs from space to citizenship; physical facts conduce or ob-
struct vibrant community and public life. RPR is more intensively 
democratic than The New Urbanism in that it imagines active citizens 
cooperatively transforming urban spaces to make them more conge-
nial. 
The third operational principle of RPR emphasizes responsive 
and incremental action. In the examples below, citizens begin to act 
when they recognize and respond to defects in their circumstances. 
They seek to repair these problems in a pragmatic, wait-and-see fash-
ion. This kind of action is necessarily piecemeal because it addresses 
only those situations that are most urgent and problematic. The citi-
zens' solutions directly affect only small portions of the totality of 
neighborhood form. This approach economizes the limited resources 
available in most urban neighborhoods by concentrating efforts on 
the most serious local concerns. More importantly, responsive incre-
mentalism respects the complexity of the dynamics connecting private 
behavior, community formation, and physicality. It attempts to man-
age the plethora of unintended consequences that inevitably accom-
panies deliberate efforts to alter these dynamics by limiting citizen 
ambition to step-wise changes in which concrete effects can be moni-
tored and incorporated into subsequent efforts. The New Urbanism, 
by contrast, often aims at a more totalizing transformation of space, 
ambitiously imposing its principles and physical picture by erasing 
that which preceded it. While they are by no means mutually exclu-
sive, the former presents a more practicable and focused approach to 
spatial reconstruction. 
A fourth consideration emphasizes the contribution of appropri-
ate political institutions. Though the three principles of participation, 
feedback, and incremental response are ubiquitous in urban spatial 
transformation, RPR suggests that they can be deliberately harnessed 
and reinforced through the appropriate political institutions. In par-
ticular, enhancing the opportunities for local and direct citizen par-
ticipation, and then rendering the agencies that construct urban 
space-departments of housing, parks, streets, sanitation, safety, edu-
cation, and the like-more responsive to these citizens would pro-
mote such institutional reform. 
The next section describes how Chicago's community policing 
reforms unintentionally created empowered local democratic spaces 
for incremental urban reconstruction. The third and fourth sections 
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offer three micro-cases of spatial reconstruction community policing 
reforms to illustrate how these dynamics have functioned in practice, 
and to draw some lessons from these experiences. This Article con-
cludes by reflecting upon the limitations of RPR's emerging approach 
and its potential contributions to other strategies of urban govern-
ance. 
II. COMMUNITY POLICING AS DEMOCRATIC CATALYST 
Drawn in the broadest terms, local democracy is a form of gov-
ernance in which people in some small area, such as a neighborhood, 
come together, discuss common problems, devise solutions, and im-
plement changes. During the 1990s, the Chicago Police Department 
(CPD) and its occasional civilian partner in community policing, the 
Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS), created a limited 
local democracy in the context of community policing.3 In 1993, the 
CPD "rolled-out" its community policing program, known as the Chi-
cago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), in five of the city's twenty-
four police districts. In 1994, the CPD began to expand the program 
to cover the entire city. One basic plank of CAPS was to divide the city 
into 279 "beats," each of which would be served by roughly the same 
patrol officers and sergeants for one-year terms.4 This administrative 
change was designed to enable officers to act in a more proactive way: 
to know their beats, to recognize particular local concerns, and to de-
vise creative solutions to specific problems of crime and disorder. Par-
allel to this state-side reform, CANS contracted with the city to organ-
ize civilian community policing groups in each of the beats to work 
with sworn officers on problems of safety and order. From the outset, 
CAPS was conceived as a public-public partnership between reorgan-
ized police officers and organized communities. 
By fleshing out the details on the community side of the equa-
tion, it appears that CAPS utilizes three means to catalyze a local 
democratic process by reconstituting relationships both between citi-
zens and the state and among citizens themselves: (1) it brings indi-
viduals together around common concerns; (2) it focuses the atten-
tion of these groups onto problems of safety and disorder; and (3) it 
specifies a distinctive communicative process of problem solving 
3 See generally V.'ESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHI-
CAGO STYLE (1997). 
4 See id. at 38-69. 
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which specifies how members are to interact with one another and 
with the state. 
First, aggregating private and often alienated citizens into delib-
erative and effective groups is a substantial problem. One fundamen-
tal difficulty is that participation is costly to the individual. It takes 
time to find out where meetings are held and then to attend. In the 
case of community policing, there is often the additional cost of pos-
sible retaliation from criminals in the community. Furthermore, the 
connection between participation and public purpose often seems 
tenuous; meetings often seem pointless, endless, and futile. Famously, 
there is also the free-rider problem: whatever public good-in terms 
of decision or action-that comes from a meeting would likely have 
happened in the absence of any single person's contribution. 
CAPS and CANS have dealt with this nexus of problems rather 
directly. In 1994, they hired fifty organizers to knock on doors, post 
posters, contact community leaders, and call and facilitate meetings. 
Their goal was to translate widespread concern about neighborhood 
safety into individual participation by lowering (or themselves paying 
for) informational and transactional costs. That, combined with the 
potential benefit that participation might increase public safety, was 
aimed at garnering citizen participation. Because common prerequi-
sites of collective action-income, education, trust, confidence, and 
social capital-were quite absent from many of these areas, it was re-
markable that the efforts of CAPS and CANS yielded substantial par-
ticipation. Between 1995 and 1999, the typical neighborhood beat 
meeting was attended by about seventeen residents.5 Though this par-
ticipation rate is not overwhelming, neither is it negligible. These 
meetings typically occur monthly in each of the city's 279 beats. 
The second element of CAPS is important and straightforward. 
The community and police officers constitute themselves to address 
problems of public safety. They do this because organizers choose a 
single, urgent, and deeply felt issue and invite anyone who is con-
cerned about that issue to take part in the common effort. Concerns 
that begin with safety often implicate a broad array of facially unre-
lated considerations-in particular configurations of physical space. 
The third constitutive element is the problem solving process by 
which these groups deliberate and act. CAPS deliberately establishes a 
5 For beat meeting participation patterns, see Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: To-
ward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. AND SOC'y Mar. 2001, at 
86-93 and SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 3, at 113-20. 
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communicative relationship among members of the public which is 
based on developing a collective capacity to solve problems.6 Elements 
of problem solving processes have been part of Chicago community 
policing since its outset and continue to evolve. One important step 
in the development of problem solving processes was its formalization 
into a CAPS "curriculum" which is taught to joint teams of police-
civilian trainers, who then teach it to members of community policing 
groups. A review of the formal program and the trainers' pedagogical 
method provides some evidence that communicative problem solving 
accurately characterizes these groups. The curriculum has three cen-
tral elements: (1) a set of criteria which a concern must meet in order 
to qualify as a community policing "problem," (2) a five-step problem 
solving process, and (3) the crime triangle:7 
Five-Step 
Problem Solving 
1. Identify and Prioritize 
2. Analyze 
I 
3. Develop Strategies 
I 
4. Implement 
I 
5. Evaluate 
offender 
In order to qualify as a "problem" to be addressed by a commu-
nity policing group, a concern must be: (1) a repeated pattern of be-
havior rather than a single incident; (2) of concern to the community 
as a whole; and (3) large enough that many people in the group can 
work on it effectively. The crime triangle provides a straightforward 
6 Many difficulties are elided in the following discussion of publics under CAPS. The 
first major omission is that certain interests/views are excluded from the beginning-the 
interests and views of drug dealers, gangsters, and prostitutes, but also sometimes interests 
of liquor store owners, landlords, and the homeless. The second major omission, albeit less 
important, is the degree of conflict present in these publics. The purpose of this discussion 
is to tease out the problem solving mechanism through which this conflict is transformed 
into consensus. 
This conception of the public (recognizing common problems and then acting collec-
tively and reflectively to solve them) adds nothing fundamental to John Dewey's concep-
tion of the public. See generallyJOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (Ohio U. Press 
1954) (1927). 
7 These figures are reproduced, essentially unchanged, from CAPS training posters. 
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method of classifying aspects of a problem by asking the following 
three questions: 
• Who is affected and how can they be protected? 
• Who is causing the problem and how can their behavior be 
changed? 
• Where is the problem occurring and why is it occurring in that 
place rather than another? 
The five-step process specifies how members of the public are to think 
about the problem and how they should act on it; this formulates a 
public process of practical reasoning. 
If this communicative and cognitive process is to succeed in any 
particular case, it must either be blessed with or, as is more often the 
case, construct for itself consensus and trust within the group because 
the implementation stage requires collective action and mutual aid. 
By limiting itself to only problems that are of general concern to 
many in the community and that require coordinated action from 
many in the group, the curriculum's definition of "problem" ensures 
that there will be a common incentive for members to cooperate. The 
step-wise problem solving method also provides a graduated, though 
steep, path to consensus, trust, and mutual reliance. For example, the 
first stage in the process is brainstorming and consensus building. 
Participants list problems of crime and disorder, together prioritize 
that list, and then select the most important problem as the one 
which they will collectively tackle. At the second and third stages, par-
ticipants attempt to discover the sources of the identified problem 
and develop strategies to attack those sources. In the fourth stage, 
members divide the labor of executing strategies among themselves, 
and make mutual commitments to perform these tasks. At the fifth 
stage, they evaluate their performance as well as the strategy as a 
whole and then revise their approaches accordingly. 
The communicative problem solving process of these community 
policing publics follows the five-step form depicted above. Trainers 
teach community members the "curriculum" by leading them 
through its steps, typically with one or two sessions dedicated to each 
step with "homework" (investigating property ownership, identities of 
usual suspects, history of action, etc.) between the meetings. Mter ini-
tial orientation and overview sessions, the next community problem 
solving meeting is dedicated to identifYing and prioritizing actual 
problems. Then a meeting is held to analyze the causes of the most 
prominent problem, and so on. 
* * * * * 
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Though many different kinds of measures emerge from these 
participatory problem solving deliberations, strategies frequently re-
volve around the reconfiguration of public space.s These strategies 
attempt to reduce local problems such as narcotics trafficking, gang 
activity, and prostitution by altering the physical space in which they 
occur, for example, by increasing lighting, closing down particular 
kinds of businesses, maintaining a police or citizen presence, remov-
ing pay phones, or simply cleaning up graffitti and trash.9 To a sur-
prising extent, enhancing public safety often requires improving the 
quality of public space in such ways. 
Two other considerations motivate this focus on space. First, a 
pressing general question is whether community policing compared 
to more traditional policing methods makes any difference at all. In 
examining outcomes, evaluators have typically sought to document 
changes in the number of index crimes or to establish attitudinal 
changes in the police or citizenry.lO Shifting attention to changes in 
physical space illuminates an additional piece of undeniable evidence 
that community policing matters. Traditional policing strategies-
street patrols, crime investigations, and emergency response-do not 
alter urban spaces in the ways that community policing action often 
does. The effect of changing space on reported crime or perceptions 
of safety remains to be seen, but it would be surprising if the reor-
ganization of space described had no pertinent effects. 
Moreover, the way space is constructed affords a focused point 
from which to compare various kinds of institutions in action. The 
configurations of the spaces we will examine were produced by indi-
vidual action mediated by modernist institutions of public hierarchies 
(the Parks Commission and the Chicago Transportation Authority 
(CTA» and real estate markets. Spaces created by these institutions 
became problematic for some citizens concerned with public safety, 
and thus were consequently reconstructed through an alternative in-
stitutional form that was more decentralized and participatory. These 
8 For a general discussion of the various strategies and tactics that emerge from Chi-
cago community policing, see generally Fung, supra note 5, and WESLEY SKOGAN ET AL., 
ON THE BEAT (1999). 
9 For some observers, graffiti is an expression of natural community or youth art. For 
others, it is a marker of gang territOl'y (the vernacular term for painting graffiti is "tag-
ging") and thus uncontrolled space. 
10 ""'hile useful, both of these measures have fundamental weaknesses. So, for exam-
ple, many practitioners reason that a wildly successful community policing program will 
result in higher measured crime rates, because those who trust the police will be more 
likely to report crimes they know about or witness. 
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spaces could have been improved through the more tradi-
tional/modern forms of market and planning bureaucracy, but the 
fact is that they were not. The attentions of actors in public agencies 
and private markets were directed elsewhere. If not for action cata-
lyzed by community policing, these spaces would have likely remained 
in unsatisfactory states for some time. That the spaces were recon-
structed through the public-public partnership outlined above raises 
the possibility that other such spaces, increasingly common in many 
urban landscapes, might also be addressed through these alternative 
political structures. 
III. THREE CASES 
A. Hot Spot in Rogers Park 
In 1992, before the formalization and spread of CAPS, residents 
in Rogers Park were already experimenting with community policing 
and problem solving methods. Residents in a beat there identified a 
host of problems on a street corner that included suspected crack 
dealing, prostitution, and noise late into the night. The disorder was 
concentrated around three rental properties near this corner. These 
properties and other salient geographic features are depicted on the 
map below: 
Laundromat 
BStreet 
! 
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After some reflection, residents determined that recent increases 
in undesirable street activity could be attributed to two main causes. 
First, the landlord of the laundromat on A Street had refused to re-
new the previous manager's lease and given management of the busi-
ness to his son. The new manager took steps to discourage drug deal-
ing on the premises, whereas the prior manager had allowed such 
activity. One significant measure was to remove pay phones in the 
laundromat.H These new policies pushed illicit activity that had been 
confined inside the building to the street outside, where suspected 
dealers relied on nearby public telephones. 
Residents traced a second line of causation to three problem 
buildings-"A," "B," and "e"-on B Street and Second Avenue which 
had recently changed ownership. The new landlords did not screen 
tenants or keep up properties as well as the previous owners. As a re-
sult, undesirable tenants occupied the buildings and disturbed the 
peace through illegal activities. Others, who had previously fre-
quented the laundromat, now haunted the bank of pay phones on the 
street and nearby dilapidated buildings. 
Residents in the community policing group used a variety of 
strategies to target these various causes with uneven success. To ad-
dress the problem of the street pay phones, they tried to convince 
tlleir owner to cancel his contract with the telephone company. The 
owner agreed to do so, but the telephone company refused to cancel 
his contract. Eventually, some members of the community policing 
group met with the company and negotiated an arrangement that the 
phones would no longer receive incoming calls. 
To target the problem properties, residents wrote letters to land-
lords to inform them of the problem and to offer to help. They or-
ganized walking groups to establish a "positive" community presence. 
They also set targets for use of nuisance abatement laws,12 which allow 
a property to be taken from a landlord if police make two drug arrests 
on a single property within one year. They then worked with police to 
facilitate/initiate target arrests in specific units. Finally, they set up a 
task force to show community support in housing court when prop-
erty was taken away from the landlord. 
The residents coordinated these strategies with police, who 
agreed to establish a greater uniformed presence at this location. 
II Pay phones are sometimes used by sellers of contraband narcotics to conduct busi-
ness. 
12 CHICAGO, ILL., HOUSING CODE ch. 7-4, §§ 8-4-090. 13-12-145 (1996); ILL. COMPo 
STAT. 5/37-2 (2000). 
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They also informed the police of known trouble makers, and the po-
lice paid special attention to these persons (e.g. by finding arrest his-
tories). Tactical police units targeted the area for arrest and surveil-
lance, while narcotics officers were deployed to make undercover 
drug "buys" and to arrest perpetrators. 
These efforts improved the space around the problem proper-
ties, and thus social conditions in the neighborhood. The nuisance 
abatement effort resulted in two arrests at the property marked "C" 
and at the same time brought the owner to housing court.13 The 
building was sold and renovated. Negotiations between the commu-
nity policing group and the landlord of the property marked "B" re-
sulted in improved management, intervention with problem tenants, 
and better tenant screening. In the "A" building, one tenant was 
evicted and another moved out. The efforts of this public-public part-
nership successfully abated many of the crime and disorder problems 
on the corner of B Street and Second Avenue. 
B. Gangs at a Chicago Transit Authority Bus Stop 
Marquette, the Chicago Police Department's tenth district, is lo-
cated in the near southwest part of Chicago. The area is racially polar-
ized, with the western end of the district being heavily Hispanic and 
the eastern side predominantly Mrican-American.14 In the early 
1990s, one of the hottest crime spots in the district was the Chicago 
Transit Authority (CTA) bus transfer station15 on the corner of 100th 
and Pullman Streets (see map below). This corner is located in the 
Hispanic sector of the district and was a center of conflict between 
several gangs. This tension was exacerbated by the addition of an-
13 The nuisance abatement law is prosecuted in criminal court, whereas housing courts 
specialize in enforcement of housing code violations. Since it is difficult to comply with the 
volumes of housing codes, one tactic of community policing groups has been to encourage 
selective enforcement of code violations on owners of problematic buildings. CHICAGO, 
ILL., HOUSING CODE ch. 7-4, §§ 8-4-090, 13-12-145 (1996); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/37-2 
(2000). 
14 The details of this case, related above, were provided in a telephone interview with 
Chicago Police Department officers in the tenth district. See generally CHICAGO COMMUNITY 
POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR Two: AN 
INTERIM REpORT, CHICAGO: ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY 41 
(1995); Dominque vVhelan, Partnerships in Action, in COMMUNITY POLICING PROJECT PA-
PERS (1995). 
15 The locations on this map have been altered to preserve anonymity. The bus line 
which runs up Pullman Street breaks at the transfer station, so a northbound passenger 
rides one bus from Bow Su'eet up to 100th Street, then waits at the transfer station for 
another bus to take the passenger the rest of the way to 91 st Street. 
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other racial variable: Mrican-American students attending a nearby 
high school to the south frequently waited for their buses at the trans-
fer station. This combination made for a "boiling cauldron," as one 
police officer put it. Though tension was constant, it would flare up 
especially after days in which fights occurred at school. Drug dealing 
and violence were sufficiently severe that the tenth district police posi-
tioned one marked car and one wagon at the transfer station during 
all school hours. 
Pullman 8t 
Arrow 
91 st st 
o CT A Bus/EL Station 
Bus Route 
CT A Transfer Sta. 
100th st -1+-----------
Bow 
110thst~------------~~~------
Residents in the then newly formed community policing beat 
group (the transfer station is in this beat) were concerned about the 
excessive use of police resources at the trouble spot. Since a car was 
devoted to monitoring the bus transfer station, the rest of the beat 
received little patrol service. Mter police explained the severity of dis-
order at the transfer station, residents decided that the best way to 
free up limited police resources was to address the problematic activ-
ity there. 
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They wrote letters to petition help from directly interested par-
ties: the alderman's office, the CTA, and the principal of the high 
school. Eventually, these authorities, the police, and the residents 
agreed to a concerted strategy. The principal staggered class times to 
reduce the density of students in the area. Most importantly, the CTA 
created a number of express buses to carry students directly from the 
high school to the main bus/elevated train (el) stop at the corner of 
Pullman and Arrow Streets, thereby bypassing the hot spot. 
Mter these measures, officers reported that tensions at the origi-
nal spot had abated to the point that their beat car no longer needed 
to maintain a permanent presence. One dynamic and ongoing result 
of this effort is that employees of the school contact the tenth district 
police station to inform them of fights in the school or other prob-
lems so that the police can be on the lookout for trouble at times 
when it is more likely to surface. 
C. The Redesign of Gill Park 
The residents in the Lake View community area of Chicago are 
generally white, middle class home owners.I6 In the early prioritizing 
part of their problem solving process, residents decided that the most 
urgent public safety problem in their neighborhood was a group of 
young people who frequented the park and whom they suspected of 
dealing crack cocaine and prostitution. Mter some analysis, they de-
termined that the problematic activity occurred mostly at night, in the 
back of the park, in an unfinished concrete structure which resem-
bled a large sunken pit. The pit, partially hidden from the street by 
trees, evidently made a good hiding place. 
In the short term, residents and police worked together to miti-
gate unlawful activity. Police patrolled the area more frequently at 
peak times identified by residents, conducted foot patrols, and en-
forced loitering and curfew laws. Neighbors living next to the park 
organized themselves to watch for illicit activity and summon police 
response via a phone tree. 
In the longer term, residents followed Jane jacobs's wisdom that 
"eyes on the street" can prevent crime and nuisances in public 
places.J7 They began with simple measures such as trimming tall trees 
to make the park's interior visible from the street. More ambitiously, 
16 Interview with John McDermott, Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, (Oct. 
23,1995). 
17 SeegenerallyJANEJACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). 
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residents sought physical improvements to make the park more use-
ful, attractive, and inviting to legitimate users in the hope that they 
might drive out illegal ones. The group has taken steps which would 
be unavailable to most other community policing groups in the city. 
First, they contacted an architect through social connections to redes-
ign the park. Mter conducting an aerial survey and consulting with 
the group, the architect developed plans that include a community 
garden, a multi-use athletic field, and plenty of night lights: 
REMOVE OBS1'RUCTNE FENCING 
I 
I I fEMOVE CONCRETE ANO ASPHALT ~!!i'IlIIi'IIllii!iSi!lil1lft (SHOWN BY CROSS-HATCHED AREAS) 
1 ~~~~ ::~RK PROPOSAL - DEMOLmON ~ 
NEW SIDEWALK 
tSti()Y.h,l BY SHADED AREAS) 
NEW ATHLETIC AELD lJOHTS 
2 ~~L~ ::~RK PROPOSAL - NEW WORK ~ 0,,","'>'(;1 IT 
.. "".[, j tl'~"OIt". ",,,,nCl 
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Next, residents secured approval to make these modifications from 
the Parks Department. They also raised more than $20,000 from the 
Chicago Cubs and local businesses to implement their new design. 
Mter construction was completed, unlawful activities and nuisances 
all but disappeared and the community use of the park increased. 
IV. THE PROMISE OF PARTICIPATORY REDESIGN 
It is, of course, unwise to develop general recommendations from 
three micro-cases and the institutions of community policing that 
made them possible. These experiences do, however, illustrate how 
the principles of participation, feedback, and incremental change can 
contribute to urban problem-solving and spatial reconfiguration. In 
all three cases, citizens and local officials were modestly successful in 
developing spatial strategies, implementing them, and thereby im-
proving the levels of public safety. Many of the mechanisms that en-
abled them to be effective are typically unavailable in top-down ap-
proaches to redesign. 
Some sources of these successes lie in the nature of participatory 
problem solving institutionalized by the city-wide community policing 
reforms. These safety-oriented neighborhood groups were able to 
gauge their own capacities and develop strategies suited to their lim-
ited resources. For example, groups in Rogers Park and Marquette 
were realistic and conservative in that they selected inexpensive 
strategies and limited, though important, goals. The Lakeview group 
was more ambitious and pursued a high-risk strategy toward park re-
habilitation. These choices were backed by residents' confidence in 
the reach of their social networks. The residents were eventually re-
warded. These groups also drew upon a rich base of local knowledge 
not only to identify problems but to ascertain the causes of these 
problems and to develop strategies to solve them. Problems too slight 
to be noticed by distant authorities, such as low-level narcotics 
trafficking on street-corners or in parks, or fights between students at 
a bus stop, often pose serious hazards and cause community decline 
when viewed from neighborhoods. I8 Even if these problems had be-
come priorities for public agencies, their solutions would likely have 
been less nimble for lack of access to the textured sense of local pri-
18 See generally GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (l971);James Q. Wilson 
& George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2, 1989, at 46 
(discussing the "broken windows" theory that minor problems lead to more serious ones). 
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orities and facts of life upon which these problem solving groups re-
lied. 
This local knowledge and access enabled residents and local 
officials in Rogers Park, Marquette, and Lakeview to navigate the 
complex confluences of spatial, organizational, and behavioral dy-
namics that both gave rise to the targeted problems and informed 
their solutions. The problems in Rogers Park were unintended conse-
quences of seemingly unrelated factors-negligent landlords and the 
location of public phones-in a socio-economically depressed neigh-
borhood. In Marquette, the bus transfer station problem in Marquette 
illustrates just how convoluted local tensions and issues can become. 
Recall that the route of a bus line, placement of a transfer station, the 
location and hours of operation of a high school, and the peculiar 
juxtaposition of two minority communities conspired to create a "hot-
spot" of regular, violent altercations. It is difficult to imagine that a 
master designer, even one gifted with extraordinary insight and 
power, could have foreseen these confluences and prevented them. 
By contrast, local problem solving groups, precisely because they 
were decentralized and attentive to local circumstances, were able to 
comprehend the full complexity of these intricate relationships and 
develop appropriately articulated responses. In Rogers Park, the solu-
tions involved simultaneous police action and negotiations with local 
landlords, proprietors, and the telephone company. In Marquette, 
the solutions required altering and coordinating the bureaucratic 
mindsets of both a local school and the city's bus system. Improving 
Lakeview involved the consent of the Parks Department, a simultane-
ous response by the police, and action from other city agencies, a pri-
vate design firm, and a charitable foundation. In these instances, 
neighborhood problem-solving yielded agile solutions that were more 
logical and visible from the local perspective. From more distant per-
spectives, these problems might have seemed hopelessly complex, and 
the solutions designed to address them might have been much more 
clumsy. 
Because these three problem-solving groups were composed of 
residents and local officials, they were also able to continuously moni-
tor the progress of their strategies and develop new tactics to replace 
ineffective ones. When both problems and solution strategies are 
complex, they will often interact with circumstances to produce unin-
tended consequences. However, problem solving groups can take 
note of these surprises and develop further dynamic strategies to cope 
with them. For instance, changing behavior at the laundromat in 
Rogers Park simply displaced problems and triggered subsequent 
2001] Citizen Participation and Responsive Spatial Reconstruction 631 
strategies. Similarly, additional concerns will probably arise in both 
Lakeview and Marquette. When they do, the citizens and local officials 
there are well positioned to respond to them. 
Both design-centered approaches such as the New Urbanism and 
what I have termed RPR aim to change both physical form and behav-
ior. The difference is that the former seeks to mold urban form based 
on general principles in the hope that such changes will enhance so-
ciability, community, and public-spiritedness. The latter approach be-
gins by taking the criticisms of modernist ambition to heart19 and rec-
ognizing the intricate relationships between form and behavior. It 
then seeks to negotiate these complexities by continuously making 
incremental adjustments to physical space-moving a bus station 
here, improving parts of a park there-and observing the actual im-
pacts of these changes on behavior. Though this path of accretion is 
less swift, it may be more sure in the end. 
Beyond abating some persistent patterns of crime and disorder, 
have these efforts advanced the more ambitious aim of fostering 
community and civic engagement? As with the New Urbanism, the 
concrete impacts of space upon civil society are difficult to disentan-
gle.20 Spatial improvements clear the way for residents and visitors to 
become more sociable in proximate public spaces. Residents are no 
longer harassed at the street corner or laundromat in Rogers Park; 
young people and adults can socialize and travel freely without fear-
ing flashes of violence at the bus station in Marquette; and Gill Park 
in Lakeview has become an attribute for the neighborhood rather 
than an affliction. However, it is less clear whether most, or even 
many, residents of these neighborhoods have utilized these improve-
ments to engage in more intensive forms of community. Though they 
offer optimistic anecdotes, the evidence is far from definitive. 
From another perspective, however, these efforts have led to the 
development of social connections and public-spiritedness by exem-
plifYing the kind of cooperative action and commitment that they 
seek to spark. The city-wide community policing initiative described 
above established institutional, rather than spatial, conditions for 
residents to coalesce around common concerns. Such projects were 
novel to many citizens who joined them. These experiences certainly 
19 See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IM-
PROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
20 See generally Emily Talen, Sense of Community and Neighborhood Form: An Assessment of 
the Social Doctrine of New Urbanism, 36 URB. STUDIES 1361 (1999). 
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marked a substantial departure by local officials toward engagement 
with residents. 
V. No NEIGHBORHOOD Is AN ISLAND 
The experiences of the three neighborhoods described above 
were marshaled with the very limited ambition of showing how a 
street-level, bottom-up strategy of urban redesign operates in practice. 
This strategy offers distinctive advantages-local information, micro-
dynamics of incremental trial-and-error feedback, an economy of stra-
tegic targeting, and a capacity to coordinate complex individual and 
institutional behaviors from the most local perspective-compared to 
more top-down strategies. Despite these promising features, RPR is 
only one approach that must be supplemented by others in the 
difficult project of urban spatial and civic reconstruction. In conclu-
sion, consider four limitations inherent in the approach that must be 
addressed by other policies: the spillover and displacement of prob-
lems from one neighborhood to another, inequalities between neigh-
borhoods, limited scope of impact, and the political stability of com-
munity relationships with public institutions. 
One difficulty is the possibility that actions beneficial to one 
neighborhood may be harmful to its neighbors. For example, the ten-
ants who vacated the "problem buildings" in Rogers Park or the al-
leged drug dealers in Lakeview might simply have moved themselves 
to nearby, less organized neighborhoods and triggered further com-
plaints there. But those who assume zero-sum displacement should 
recall that the original behaviors were facilitated by a confluence of 
factors that attracted problematic behavior to specific locations; a few 
relatively minor changes were sufficient to abate them. Although 
those who cause these problems may have moved on, they may not 
have found equally opportune sites for illicit activity. Beyond this, the 
inability of one neighborhood to join together against its own prob-
lems is hardly a reason for its neighbors to refrain from collective self-
help. 
Such spillover possibilities, however, do raise the very serious 
problem, ubiquitous in urban areas, that some neighborhoods are 
better able to organize than others due to their residents' wealth, 
education, status, race, political advantage, or superior social capital. 
The Lakeview experience demonstrates one way in which socioeco-
nomic inequalities in the city may significantly limit the capacities of 
different community policing groups. Lakeview residents are wealth-
ier than those of the other two areas discussed; their problems are less 
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severe; and their collective resources are greater. Partially as a conse-
quence of these advantages, a member of the group was able to call 
upon a network of friends, one of whom possessed architectural re-
sources and expertise. These kinds of skills and resources are unavail-
able to social networks in most other Chicago communities. Further-
more, urban agencies such as the Parks Department may be more 
disposed to respond positively to requests from residents of wealthy 
neighborhoods. 
Neighborhood inequality does not argue against RPR as such, but 
it does suggest that the public policies that make RPR possible ought 
also to pay attention to these inequalities and seek to address them. 
For example, the police or Parks Department might channel addi-
tional resources to poor neighborhoods through policies of adminis-
trative redistribution. To the extent that public bodies provide train-
ing and outreach services to equip residents to think creatively about 
neighborhood problems, and physical and social resources to solve 
them, those bodies ought to channel support to the most deprived 
areas; thereby mitigating differential capacities between neighbor-
hoods. Such efforts cannot completely compensate for underlying 
socio-economic urban inequalities, but may suggest how public poli-
cies might reap the benefits of local civic action without exacerbating 
inequalities as devolutionary approaches often do. 
A third objection, arising from the incremental nature of RPR, is 
that the approach accomplishes very little in the area of neighbor-
hood revitalization. The achievements of the three groups described 
are relatively modest when considered against the troubles of the 
larger city. However, they should not be discounted because each 
group did reduce some of the most persistent problems in its particu-
lar area. Assessing the scale of these acomplishments against city-wide 
problems obscures the proper conceptualization of RPR as a principle 
to guide urban strategies and as a spatial component of them rather 
than as an exclusive alternative.21 I imagine RPR as a strategy that 
would complement conventional economic development, employ-
ment, housing, and social service efforts by making residential and 
commercial public spaces more secure, and, therefore, conducive to 
trade, work, and living. In the arena of spatial reconfiguration, one 
might even imagine RPR supplementing top-down New Urbanist 
planning. While the latter, if well conceived and executed, might yield 
21 See Susan Fainstein, New Directions in Plflnning Theory, URB. AFT. REv., Mar. 2000, at 
451 (discussing alleged alternative frames for considering urban problems and solutions). 
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dramatic improvements in an area, new and unforeseen problems 
would likely arise. RPR, as a continuous and incremental strategy, 
might then helpfully succeed the shock therapy of good design. 
A final set of considerations addresses the political basis of RPR 
institutions. As emphasized above, RPR does not result from sponta-
neous civic organization and mutual aid. It is instead a consequence 
of deliberate, city-wide, and supra-neighborhood, public policies that 
convene and empower residents of neighborhoods to consider and 
address the problems that face them. These public policies both con-
struct a framework for local deliberation and endow decisions made 
there with public resources. For example, the expertise and energy of 
police officers, portions of the school system, parks department, and 
transportation authority are necessary to give them force. Without 
this governmental framework, neither the neighborhood deliberation 
nor action of RPR would have occurred. 
This dependent relationship between neighborhoods and 
officials in downtown offices creates the potential for conflict and po-
litical instability. When residents in neighborhoods make demands 
and launch criticisms of city government to prod agencies to action or 
hold them accountable, officials may respond by withdrawing the re-
sources and cooperation necessary for RPR. Some have alleged that 
Chicago officials have acted in just that way when they withdrew fund-
ing from sometimes critical community organizations involved in 
community policing.22 The only antidote to this political instability 
lies in the larger polity itself. Like any public policy, RPR requires a 
constituency to flourish. Its natural constituency is composed of the 
neighborhood residents who depend on public resources to carry out 
their local improvement strategies. However, supporters of RPR would 
have to look beyond their immediate concerns and reach across 
neighborhood boundaries to support overarching policies upon 
which each independently depends, but which they can only secure 
together. This political interdependence mirrors the structure of solv-
ing complex urban problems. Local intelligence and action is neces-
sary because broad centralized measures are too crude. Nonetheless, 
isolated local efforts are by themselves insufficient because they lack 
the force and often the wisdom required for effective action. As citi-
zens whose cities are in dire need, our attention must be simultane-
ously and judiciously directed toward our immediate concerns as well 
22 See Archon Fung, Contract Expired: Is Chicago Poised to Take the Community Out of Com-
munity Policing?, NEIGHBORHOOD WORKS, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 8. 
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as toward the welfare of those who are more distant and thus less visi-
ble, but nevertheless inextricably tied to us. 

